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LIABILITY RULES FOR SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE
LIABILITY RULES FOR SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE:
A SIMPLE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
D.H. Cole*
INTRODUCTION
The law of surface water drainage has evolved dramatically in the last
half-century. Spurred by economic considerations of equity and efficiency,
courts have replaced longstanding property rules based on antiquated notions
of absolute dominion and strict servitude with a rule based on the reasonable-
ness standard of Tort law. Today, a majority of states favor the "reasonable
use" rule for resolving surface water disputes over the "common enemy"
and "natural flow" theories.'
Drainage disputes typically arise as a consequence of land develop-
ment. Alterations in land gradation and construction affect the flow of dif-
fused surface waters, often to the detriment of neighboring properties. 2 For
most of U.S. history courts decided such disputes under either the common
enemy rule, which creates an absolute entitlement to use and improve land, 3
*Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1986, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and
Clark College, Portland, Oregon; A.M. 1981, University of Chicago; A.B. 1980, Occidental
College.
The author wishes to thank Professor A. Mitchell Polinsky of the Stanford Law School for his
helpful comments on a draft of this paper, and Glenn Schwarzbach of the Santa Clara University
School of Law for his editorial assistance.
I Presently, 18 states exclusively employ the reasonable use rule, 14 states exclusively employ the civil
law's natural flow theory, and 13 states exclusively employ the common enemy doctrine. See infra
notes 83-99, 58-71, 25-37, respectively.
2
"[S]urface waters consist of waters from rains, springs, or melting snow which lie or flow on the
surface of the earth, but which do not form a part of a well-defined body of water or natural
watercourse." Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 424, 88 N.W.2d 83, 87 (1958). See also
Kinyon and McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891, 891 n.l (1940).
When the surface waters flow together, forming a well- defined channel, they lose their diffused
character, and rules governing watercourses apply. Comment, Toward a Unified Reasonable Use
Approach to Water Drainage in Washington, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 61, 68 (1983).
3Specifically, the common enemy doctrine permits landowners to alter surface water flows with
impunity for resulting damages to neighboring properties. See infra notes 12-38 and accompanying
text. In effect, it represents what Professor Ellickson has called a "laissez faire distribution of
property rights." Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 719 (1973).
The conceptual distinctions between Property and Tort theories are minimized by regarding the
competing interests as "entitlements," protected by property or liability rules. See Calabresi and
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 1089, 1090 (1972). In drainage disputes, as in all cases involving competing interests, courts
must choose which property right is "entitled" to protection. After choosing the entitlement, the court
must determine how best to protect that entitlement, i.e., the court must fashion a suitable remedy.
Id. at 1092. As this article illustrates, the court's choice of remedy effects economic efficiency and
cost allocation every bit as much as its choice of entitlement.
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or the civil law's natural flow theory, which creates a converse
entitlement to protect land from interferences with natural drainage. 4
A third rule, based on the Tort concept of reasonable use, originated in
the 1860s, but as of 1940 only two states employed it to resolve drainage
disputes. 5 This reasonable use rule grants landowners a qualified entitlement
to make cost-effective improvements. 6
Since 1940, sixteen states have abandoned one or the other of the old
rules in favor of the reasonable use theory. 7 The basis for this change has
been largely economic. Courts and commentators perceived that the Tort-
based theory would produce more efficient 8 and more equitable results. 9
Unfortunately, they were mistaken.
This article examines the economic consequences of the three theories
of liability for surface water drainage. It concludes that while the reasonable
use rule is economically justifiable and generally promotes efficient devel-
opment, the theory unfairly allocates the costs of improvements, allowing
the "reasonable" user to divert her improvement costs-along with the
water-to her unconsenting neighbor. The common enemy rule is even
worse, serving neither efficiency nor equity. Only the natural flow theory is
capable of combining efficient development with fair results. 10 By imposing
liability in every case, the natural flow theory equitably allocates improve-
ment costs while permitting courts to obtain efficient results.
4Specifically, this rule creates liability for any interference with natural surface water flows. See infra
notes 39-72 and accompanying text.
5Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 908 ("At the present time only two jurisdictions can be fairly
said to have adopted the full reasonable use rule - New Hampshire and Minnesota.").6Specifically, this rule insulates landowners from liability for damages resulting from "reasonable"
alterations in surface water flows. See infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text. On qualified or
"intermediate" entitlements, see Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1086-87 (1980); see also supra note 5
and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
8See, e.g., Burnett, Surface Water and Nuisance Law: A Proposed Synthesis, 20 Idaho L. Rev. 185,
193 (1984) ("A standard of reasonableness, with its balancing approach, provides the closest judicial
equivalent to efficient allocation of resources through voluntary transfers."); Comment, The Flow of
Surface Water Law in Connecticut, 14 Conn. L. Rev. 601, 608 (1982).
9See, e.g., County of Clark v. Powers, 96 Nev. 497, 503, 611 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1980) ("[Tlhe
reasonable use rule allows for a more equitable allocation of the incidental economic costs . . .
than does the natural flow rule."); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 274, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (1975)
("[Tihe [reasonable use] standard which we embrace today will permit a more equitable allocation of
the costs of such improvements, for the owner improving his land must take into consideration the
true cost of such development to the community."); Comment, Massachusetts Law - Surface Waters
- Effect of Reasonable Use Standard on Surface Water Controversies, 2 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 549,
558-59 (1980) ("By rejecting the common enemy rule and adopting the reasonable use rule in 1978,
the Massachusetts court has taken a great step toward implementing the current social policy of just
allocation of development costs.").
'°This article is not the first to posit this thesis. See Comment, California's Surface Waters, 39 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 128, 135-36 (1966).
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Part I of this article explicates the American laws of drainage. Part
II evaluates the three theories of liability, in their pure and modified
formulations, for economic efficiency and distributional fairness. The two
key factors in that evaluation are (1) whether the theories create liability
constraining only inefficient improvements; and (2) what remedies they pro-
vide. In the final analysis, the natural flow theory, if generally restricted to
an actual damages remedy, promotes economic efficiency and distributional
fairness far better than either the common enemy doctrine or the reasonable
use rule.
I. THE LIABILITY RULES
The three American rules for resolving surface water disputes devel-
oped contemporaneously in the mid-nineteenth century. However, they
developed independently. Early cases that adopted the common enemy rule,
for instance, typically did not consider the other theories of liability. 1' But,
as the country entered the twentieth century, courts began to compare and
reassess the rules, modifying their applications to reflect changed societal
conditions.
A. The Common Enemy Rule
Historically misassociated with the common law of England, 12 the
common enemy doctrine appeared in U.S. court decisions as early as
1851.13 Under this doctrine, any landowner may alter with impunity the
flow of surface waters to or from adjoining lands.14 Contrary to contem-
porary understanding, the early courts did not employ this rule primarily
to promote society's interest in land development. 15 The cornerstone of
the common enemy rule was the ancient property maxim cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum (whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky). 16
"See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 902. Likewise, early cases adopting the natural flow
theory did not consider the common enemy doctrine. Id. at 895. Neither did they consider the
reasonable use rule. Id. at 895 n. 14.
12The English courts have historically employed the civil law's natural flow theory of liability in surface
water disputes. See Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 Nat. Res. J.
72, 78 (citing Ewart v. Cochrane, 4 Macq. H.L. Cas. 117, 7 Jur. N.S. 925, 5 L.T.N.S. 1, 10 Week
Rep. 3 (1861)). Nevertheless, some U.S. courts adopted the common enemy doctrine specifically
because they believed it represented the English common law. See Edwards v. Charlotte, C. &
A. R.R. Co., 39 S.C. 472, 474-75 (1893); Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 83 Mo.
271 (1884). See also Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 899-902.
3 Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171 (1851).
14The clearest early statement of this rule is found in Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen)
106 (1865).
15But see Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 148 (1881) ("Society has an interest in the cultivation
and improvement of lands, and in the reclamation of waste lands. It is also for the public interest
that improvements shall be made, and that towns and cities shall be built. ").
6 See Gannon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 109-110 ("[T]he right of a party to the free and unfettered
control of his own land above, upon, and beneath the surface cannot be interfered with or restrained
by any considerations of injury to others which may be occasioned by the flow of mere surface
water.").
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The right to alter drainage patterns was incidental to the landowner's
absolute dominion over her property. Resulting damages to neighboring
landowners afforded no cause of action. 17 Neighbors could respond only
by making improvements or constructing barriers of their own, or by
purchasing negative easements.
In this extreme form, the common enemy rule encouraged land
improvement by completely insulating developing landowners from lia-
bility. 18 And, according to courts and commentators, the pure common
enemy rule minimized litigation because it delineated with certainty the
rights of adjoining landowners. 19
But, while the common enemy rule kept landowners out of court,
it hardly resolved their disputes. Rather, it fostered escalating drainage
wars, limited only by landowners' means and imagination. 20 Eventually,
the detrimental effects of the extreme common enemy rule, along with
changed societal conditions that no longer prescribed land development at
all costs, impelled courts to modify the rule.
Many courts alleviated the injuries visited on neighboring properties by
holding improving landowners liable for harmful discharges using artificial
drainways. 21 They also imposed a good faith requirement prohibiting mali-
cious and negligent discharges. 22 Many states began requiring developing
landowners to use "reasonable care" to avoid unnecessary damage to
adjoining properties. 23
7See id. at 110 ("A party may improve any portion of his land, although he may thereby cause the
surface water flowing thereon, whencesoever it may come, to pass off in a different direction and
in larger quantities than previously. If such an act causes damages to adjacent land, it is damnum
absque injuria. ").
18See, e.g., Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 898-99 (citing Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140,
148 (1881)).
19See, e.g., Maloney & Plager, supra note 12, at 78; Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 268, 341 A.2d
735, 737 (1975). There is no evidence that application of the common enemy rule has minimized
litigation, compared to civil law and reasonable use jurisdictions.
2
°See Maloney & Plager, supra note 12, at 78 ("[Llandowners are encouraged to engage in
contests of hydraulic engineering in which might makes right, and breach of the peace is often
inevitable. ").
21See, e.g., Lindamood v. Board of Educ., 92 W. Va. 387, 114 S.E. 800 (1922). See also Comment,
Ohio Surface Water Rights, 38 Cinn. L. Rev. 525, 526 (1969).
22See Maloney & Pager, supra note 12, at 79.
23See, e.g., Harris Motor Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 151 Va. 125, 144 S.E. 414 (1928); Mullins
v. Greer, 226 Va. 587, 311 S.E.2d 110 (1984).
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In 1940, twenty-two jurisdictions employed the common enemy
rule. 24 Today, only thirteen jurisdictions retain it, including Arizona, 25
Arkansas, 26 Indiana, 27 Maine, 28 Missouri, 29 Montana, 30 Nebraska, 3 1 New
York, 32 Oklahoma, 33 South Carolina, 34 Virginia, 35 Washington, 36 and the
District of Columbia. 37 Two states, Alabama and Kansas, apply the common
enemy rule only in urban drainage disputes.38
24See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 902-04 (listing Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin).
25See, e.g., Roosevelt.Irrigation Dist. v. Beardsley Land & Investment Co., 36 Ariz. 65, 282 P.
937 (1929).26See, e.g., McCoy v. Board of Directors of Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 95 Ark. 345, 129 S.W.
1097 (1910).27See, e.g., Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 977-78 (Ind. 1982) (expressly disapproving an
appellate court decision adopting the reasonable use rule in Rounds v. Hoelscher, 428 N.E.2d 1308
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).2SSee, e.g., Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978).29See, e.g., M.H. Siegfried Real Estate v. City of Independence, 649 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1983).30See, e.g., Tillinger v. Frisbie, 138 Mont. 60, 353 P.2d 645 (1960).
31See, e.g., Shotkoski v. Prososki, 219 Neb. 213, 362 N.W.2d 59 (1985).32See, e.g., Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47, 228 N.E.2d
386 (1967).33See, e.g., Iven v. Roder, 431 P.2d 321, 328 (Okla. 1967). But see, Dobbs v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
416 F. Supp. 5, 9 (E.D. Okla. 1975) (apparently applying the common enemy rule in a way equivalent
to the reasonable use rule).
34See, e.g., Abrams v. Wright, 262 S.C. 141, 202 S.E.2d 859 (1974).35See, e.g., Mullins v. Greer, 226 Va. 587, 311 S.E.2d 110 (1984).36See, e.g., Island County v. Makie, 36 Wash. App. 385, 675 P.2d 607 (1984).37See, e.g., Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888 (D.C. 1972).
38See, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885 (1966); Goering v. Schrag, 167 Kan. 499,
207 P.2d 391 (1949). On urban drainage disputes, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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B. The Civil Law Rule: Natural Flow Theory
Like the common enemy rule, the natural flow theory had its origins
in ancient Roman property rules, 39 but the theories are antithetical. Where
the common enemy rule insulated improving landowners from liability, the
natural flow theory imposed liability for any harmful diversion. 40
Based on the maxim aqua currit, et debet curerer, ut solebat es juie
naturae (water runs, and it should run, as it is used to run naturally),
the natural flow theory creates a servitude requiring landowners to accept
waters naturally flowing from higher lands. The lower-landowner cannot
divert those waters at the higher-landowner's expense, but neither can the
higher-landowner increase the burden on the servient estate by increasing
the flow or changing its course. 4 1
The courts of Louisiana imported the natural flow theory from the civil
law of France in 1812.42 But, the theory did not win wide acceptance
in the United States until the second half of the nineteenth century. 43
By 1940 eighteen states purported to employ the civil law rule exclu-
sively. 44
Like the common enemy rule, the natural flow theory had the ben-
efit of predictability-landowners' rights were delineated with certainty. 45
And, the natural flow theory sensibly paralleled existing rules applying to
watercourses. 46 It also had the benefit of fairness; courts early on recognized
39See supra note 16 and accompanying text, and infra note 41 and accompanying text.
4°See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 893.
41See, e.g., Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa 160, 168 (1866). See also Maloney & Plager, supra
note 12, at 76.42 Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (Orleans 1812). The theory also has ties to the
common law of England. See Maloney & Plager, supra note 12, at 76. This is ironic, considering
that the common enemy rule has been called the "common law rule," though it has no ties to the
common law of England. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.43 Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the civil law rule after Louisiana. See Martin v. Riddle, 26
Pa. 415 (1848).
"See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 896-97 (listing Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas).
45See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 402, 412 P.2d 529, 532, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1966).
46See Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158, 162 (1869).
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that the natural flow rule was more equitable than the common enemy rule
because it imposed all improvement costs on the improving landowner. 47 In
addition, they recognized that application of this rule preserved agricultural
lands. 48
By the turn of the century, however, commentators and courts in
many jurisdictions increasingly condemned the rule for hindering land
development. 49 Courts also criticized the civil law rule because of the
evidentiary burden it presented; it was no simple matter to determine the
course and amount of flow before diversion in order to determine the extent
of the damages. 50
Many courts relied on these criticisms in modifying the natural flow
theory. Their modifications effectively limited access to the courts by
insulating improving landowners from liability for certain types or degrees
of flow alteration. For example, some jurisdictions allowed landowners
to increase surface water flows without liability, so long as they used
natural drainways. 51 Many states began to employ a balancing test under
which an improving landowner would be held liable only for negligent or
47See, e.g., id. ("[T]here can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of application
as that which enforces natural laws. ").48Garland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 560-62, 53 S.W. 940, 941 (1899). This justification seems the
flip-side to the oft stated criticism that the civil law rule impedes development. See infra note 49
and accompanying text.
49See, e.g., Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201,208,236 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1977); Butler v. Bruno,
115 R.I. 264, 269, 341 A.2d 735, 738 (1975); Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 402-03, 412 P.2d at 533, 50
Cal. Rptr. at 277; Burnett, Surface Water and Nuisance Law: A Proposed Synthesis, 20 Idaho L.
Rev. 185, 192 (1984); Maloney & Prager, supra note 12, at 76; Comment, Massachusetts Law
- Surface Waters - Effect of Reasonable Use Standard on Surface Water Controversies, 2 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 549, 553 (1980); Comment, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas,
42 Mo. L. Rev. 76, 77 (1977).
However, there was no evidence suggesting that jurisdictions employing the civil law rule
encountered any downturn in development. See Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 407, 412 P.2d at 535, 50 Cal.
Rptr. at 279 ("California's phenomenal growth rate, to which no one can be oblivious and of which
this court may take judicial notice, appears unstunted by the existence and application of the civil
law rule since 1873.").
5
°Butler, 115 R.I. at 269, 341 A.2d at 738. Nevertheless, this difficulty could not reasonably justify
a rejection of the natural flow theory in favor of other rules that would not even provide plaintiffs
an opportunity to prove their damages.
51See, e.g., La Fleur v. Kolda, 71 S.D. 162, 22 N.W.2d 741 (1946).
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unreasonable changes in surface water flows. 52 In an even more drastic
measure to spur development, some states replaced the natural flow theory
with the common enemy doctrine or reasonable use rule for disputes arising
in urban areas. 53
The California Supreme Court in the case of Keys v. Romley, 54 devel-
oped a unique modification of the natural flow theory that obligated the
neighbor, as well as the improving landowner, to act reasonably. Specifi-
cally, the neighbor must "take reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce
any actual or potential injury. ' ' 55 But, this does not necessarily mean that
neighboring landowners must incur costs to prevent harm; the facts of
the case suggest that the court was primarily concerned with neighboring
landowners who aggravate their losses, e.g., by removing existing barriers
that would have prevented harm. 56 In cases where both parties act reason-
ably, the improving landowner remains liable just as under the pure natural
flow theory. 57
Despite the criticisms and modifications, the natural flow theory has not
incurred the same dramatic decline evidenced by the common enemy rule
since 1940. Fourteen states continue to exclusively employ some form of the
52See, e.g., Vinson v. Turner, 252 Ala. 271,40 So. 2d 863 (1949); Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542,
124 A.2d 288 (1956).
In jurisdictions where courts have adopted a reasonableness test under the natural flow theory,
the civil law rule mirrors the modified common enemy doctrine. While the one allows landowners to
drain lands except by artificial drainways, the other prohibits drainage except by natural drainways.
See Maloney & Plager, supra note 12, at 79. But, as Professors Maloney and Plager have Warned,
this does not mean the rules are effectively identical. In practical respects, such as burdens of proof,
they remain opposed. Id. In addition, as the forthcoming economic analysis will demonstrate, the
common enemy rule and natural flow theory can have vastly different effects on strategic behavior
and overall efficiency, even in their modified versions. See infra Part II.
Similarly, the civil law rule as modified by reasonableness standards remains practically
distinguishable from the reasonable use rule, although there has been some confusion of the two
rules. For example, after Keys v. Romlev, some lower courts in California mistakenly assumed that
the state had adopted the reasonable use rule. See, e.g., Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, 60
Cal. App. 3d 453, 458 (1976). However, it is clear that the California Supreme Court in Keys v.
Romley did not reject the civil law rule in favor of the rule of reasonable use. Where the reasonable
use rule would insulate an improving landowner from liability for any reasonable change in surface
water flow, the California natural flow theory modification would continue to find liability, so long
as the injured neighbor also acted reasonably.
53See, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885 (1966); Goering v. Schrag, 167 Kan. 499,
207 P.2d 391 (1949); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971). See also Comment,
The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L. Rev. 76 (1977).
-464 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
551d. at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.56The court in Keys v. Romley determined that the plaintiffs were substantially responsible for their
own injuries because they removed a dirt pile which might have prevented some of the flooding
which occured when the defendants improved their property. Id. at 411, 412 P.2d at 538, 50 Cal.
Rptr. at 282.
571d. at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
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natural flow theory. They include Colorado, 58 Georgia, 59 Idaho, 60 Illinois, 61
Iowa, 62 Louisiana, 63 Michigan, 64 New Mexico, 65 Oregon, 66 Pennsylvania, 67
Tennessee, 68 Texas, 69 Vermont, 70 and West Virginia. 71 Three other states,
Alabama, Kansas, and South Dakota, employ the natural flow theory to
resolve surface water disputes arising in rural areas. 72
C. The Reasonable Use Rule
Unlike the common enemy and natural flow theories, the reasonable
use rule for resolving drainage disputes was not born of ancient Roman rules
respecting absolute property rights. It is an American original based on the
Tort principle of reasonableness. Under this rule, improving landowners
are free to make reasonable use of their lands, even if this causes harmful
changes in surface water flows. 73 What constitutes a "reasonable" use is
determined case-by-case "in accordance with general principles of fairness
and common sense," rather than by inflexible rules based on absolute
property rights. 74
The surface water rule of reasonable use is almost identical to the
modern law of private nuisance. Under the Restatement (2d) of Torts, an
actor is liable for a private nuisance if her conduct unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of another's property.75 Reasonableness is
determined primarily in a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the gravity of
the harm against the utility of the conduct. If the benefits outweigh the costs,
the improving landowner is not liable. 76
58City of Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., 73 Colo. 426, 216 P.2d
553 (1923).59Gill v. First Christian Church, 216 Ga. 454, 117 S.E.2d 164 (1960).
6°Smith v. King Creek Grazing Ass'n, 105 Idaho 644, 671 P.2d 1107 (Ct. App. 1983).6 1Bodenschatz v. Parrott, 153 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 506 N.E.2d 617 (1987).
62Witthauer v. Council Bluffs, 257 Iowa 493, 133 N.W.2d 71 (1965).
63Walters v. Thrasher, 381 So. 2d 557 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
64Lewallen v. Niles, 86 Mich. App. 332, 272 N.W.2d 350 (1978).65Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952).66Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 214 Or. 554, 330 P.2d 28 (1958).67Laform v. Bethlehem Township, 346 Pa. Super. 512, 499 A.2d 1373 (1985).
68Kind v. Johnson City, 63 Tenn. App. 666, 478 S.W.2d 63 (1970).
69City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968); Abbott v. City of Princeton, 721
S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
70Swanson v. Bishop Farm, Inc., 140 Vt. 606, 443 A.2d 464 (1982), overruled on other grounds in
Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615,471 A.2d 224 (1983).
71Tierney v. Earl, 153 W. Va. 790, 172 S.E.2d 558 (1970).
72See, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885 (1966); Goering v. Schrag, 167 Kan. 499,
207 P.2d 391 (1949); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971).
73See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 904.
741d. at 905.
75RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1977).
761d. § 826(a). But see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, courts applying the reasonable use rule for resolving drain-
age conflicts rely heavily on the cost-benefit analysis; 77 if the benefits to
the improving landowner outweigh the costs to her neighbor, then the
neighbor's injuries will not be remedied. In addition, courts applying the
reasonable use rule often will inquire whether the improving landowner
took steps to avoid unnecessary harm to neighboring lands and whether
the drainage was reasonably necessary to effect the desired use or improve-
ment. 78
The Restatement (2d) of Torts expressly applies its nuisance analysis
to surface water disputes, 79 but most states still consider the reasonable use
rule a special doctrine of drainage law, distinct from the ordinary private
nuisance action. 80 There are in fact significant differences between the two
actions. For example, in a private nuisance claim under the Restatement,
a harmful improvement is unreasonable per se if the court finds that the
neighbor's injuries are too severe to go uncompensated, regardless of
the cost-benefit analysis. 81 The reasonable use rule for resolving drainage
disputes provides no similar exception for severe harm.82
In 1940, only New Hampshire and Minnesota employed the reasonable
use rule to resolve surface water disputes. 83 Since then, sixteen states have
abandoned one of the old Property-based doctrines in favor of the Tort-
based rule. They include Alaska, 84 Connecticut, 85 Delaware, 86 Hawaii, 87
Kentucky,88 Maryland,89 Massachusetts,90 Mississippi,9 1 Nevada, 92 New
Jersey, 93 North Carolina, 94 North Dakota, 95 Ohio,96 Rhode Island, 97 Utah, 98
"See, e.g., Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 168, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948).78See, e.g., id.
79RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1977).
8°See Maloney & Plager, supra note 12, at 80. But see Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201,216-17,
236 S.E.2d 787, 796-97 (1977) (treating the reasonable use rule as a private nuisance action under
the Restatment (2d) of Torts).
"
1RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (1972).
82However, jurisdictions that treat the reasonable use rule as a private nuisance action under
the Restatement appear to apply this exception. See, e.g., Pendergrast, 293 N.C. 201, 236
S.E.2d 787.
S3See supra note 5.
84Weinberg v. North Alaska Development Corp.. 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963).
85Page Motor Co. v. Baker, 182 Conn. 434, 438 A.2d 739 (1980).
86 Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980).
S7Cootey v. Sun Investment Co., 690 P.2d 1324 (Haw. App. Ct. 1984).
88Klutey v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967).
89 Beane v. Prince George's County, 20 Md. App. 383, 315 A.2d 777 (1974).
9°rucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978).
91Hall v. Wood, 443 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1983).
92County of Clark v. Powers, 96 Nev. 497, 611 P.2d 1072 (1980).
93Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
94Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
95Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967).
96McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Development Corp., 62 Ohio St. 2d 55 (1980).97Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975).
9SSanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
[Vol. 12:1
1990 LIABILITY RULES FOR SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE 45
and Wisconsin. 99 One other state, South Dakota, applies the reasonable use
rule to all drainage disputes arising in urban areas. 100
This dramatic emergence is due, in part, to dissatisfaction with the two
Property-based rules. It also reflects a perception that the reasonable use
theory is fairer simply because it is more flexible. °10 But, its flexibility
also has inspired criticism of the rule by judges who believe it is "nothing
more than an invitation to a lawsuit." 102 No doubt, where correlative rights
remain ambiguous until delineated in court, lawsuits will proliferate. In
addition, application of the reasonable use rule appears to present courts
with the same evidentiary burden encountered under the natural flow theory:
to complete its cost-benefit analysis, the court must assess the damages
resulting from the drainage, and, therefore, must determine the pre-drainage
direction and extent of surface water flow. '0 3 Nevertheless, an increasing
number of jurisdictions appear prepared to accept these costs along with
the seemingly obvious benefits of the reasonable use rule. Unfortunately,
the courts employing this rule have assumed those benefits without testing
the rule's precise effects. As the following economic analysis demonstrates,
the benefits of the reasonable use rule are largely illusory.
II. Economic Analysis
A. General Introduction: Goals and Assumptions
The "best" liability rule for resolving surface water disputes depends
on the goal(s) society elects. If unhindered land development is the goal,
the common enemy rule clearly is best; if land preservation is the goal, the
natural flow theory may be preferred. Today, economic goals prevail and
the "best" rule most fairly allocates improvement costs while maximizing
economic efficiency. 10 4
1. The Efficiency Goal
Put simply, a liability rule is efficient if it entitles profitable drainage
and does not entitle unprofitable drainage. A drainage is profitable if its
aggregate benefits exceed its aggregate costs (i.e., costs to all parties),
99Getka v. Lader, 71 Wis. 2d 237, 238 N.W.2d 87 (1976).
1°°Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971).
0 11n addition, its current popularity could be a function of its similarity to the common private nuisance
action and the judiciary's craving for more discretion in deciding cases.
10 2Pagliotti v. Acquistaspace, 46 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Ct. App. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 64
Cal. 2d 873, 412 P.2d 538, 50 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1966).
10 3See supra note 50 and accompanying text. This evidentiary problem has been generally ignored by
the courts. Some courts have denied that the reasonable use rule presents any such burden. See, e.g.,
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 216, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977).
U°4See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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including transaction costs. 105 However, the court's choice of entitlement
is only one factor in the efficiency equation; the remedy the court fashions
to protect that entitlement also affects overall efficiency.
The court's choice of remedy impedes efficiency if it prohibits (or
inhibits) a drainage that yields net social profits, or allows (or encourages) a
drainage that generates net social costs. In some circumstances, the remedy
may encourage "strategic behavior" by disputants, preventing them from
bargaining to an efficient result. 106
Theoretically, an actual damages remedy should always achieve an
efficient outcome, assuming that the court has perfect information con-
cerning the extent and nature of the harm resulting from the drainage.
Actual damage awards merely redistribute costs, and therefore provide
no incentive to strategic behavior; the remedy affords neither party an
extra bargaining chip. 107 However, without perfect information, the court
may over-estimate or under-estimate damages, and thereby compromise
efficiency. 108 In addition, if land uses or values differ significantly, courts
may be forced to make non-economic judgments that affect efficiency. Land
use and land value problems most often arise in urban drainage disputes, and
have induced some courts to adopt different rules for those cases than they
employ in rural drainage disputes. 109 Injunctive relief jeopardizes efficiency
if it curtails a drainage that yields net profits. On the other hand, a decision
to enjoin a drainage that generates net costs guarantees an efficient result.
In any case, if the injunctive remedy is not tied to efficiency, strategic
behavior is inevitable. 110 However, the American drainage laws are liability
05Transaction costs include "the costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the
costs of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of
enforcing any bargain reached." A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 12 (1983).
Strategic behavior is also a type of transaction cost. Id. at 18 n. 11; see also infra note 106.
1°6Strategic behavior is a type of transaction cost that arises from alterations in bargaining position
created by the court's choice of entitlement and remedy. For example, if the parties know that the
court will enjoin even an efficient drainage, the injured party may "hold out" for a better deal than
the efficient result would provide. See A. Polinsky, supra note 105, at 18-19; Polinsky, The
Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1092-96 (1980).
'
0 7See Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1094. In economic terms, the goal of the actual damages remedy is
simply to force the improving landowner to internalize the costs of improvement. See, e.g., Tromans,
Nuisance-Prevention or Payment?, 41 Cambridge L.J. 87, 105 (1982).
08 For example, if a drainage yields net costs of $100. theoretically that activity should be suspended.
But, if the court undervalues damages by $200 because of imperfect information, that drainage will
likely continue. Likewise, imperfect information can lead courts to over-estimate damages, resulting
in suspension of a net profitable drainage.
1°9See supra notes 39, 54, 73 & 101 and accompanying text. In rural settings, neighbors tend to use
their lands similarly, and land values are usually not disparate. In urban settings, by contrast,
neighboring lands are typically put to vastly different uses, and land values can differ significantly
from one property to the next.
I"0See Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1092-93. A court that grants injunctive relief for any injurious
drainage encourages the injured party to engage in strategic behavior.
[Vol. 12:1
LIABILITY RULES FOR SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE
rules only; they do not prescribe the appropriate relief for various economic
circumstances. Historically, the common law automatically enjoined any
nuisance. 111 Fortunately, courts applying the rules today do consider the
economic consequences of potential remedies before granting relief. 11 2
2. The Equity Goal
Liability rules that maximize efficiency are not ergo fair. Efficiency
concerns only "the size of the pie." 113 Equity slices the pie, allocating costs
(and sometimes benefits) to promote some (or someone's) conception of
fairness. 114 For purposes of this analysis, fairness depends entirely on who
must bear the costs of damages resulting from surface water drainage. If the
improving landowner must bear the costs, the rule is fair. If the "innocent"
neighbor must bear the costs, the rule is unfair.
Almost everyone would agree that a landowner who injures her
neighbor by draining surface waters should compensate for those injuries.
Aside from this intuitive sense of justice, there are other factors that suggest
the improving landowner should bear the costs of drainage. Assuming that
the drainage is intentional, the improving landowner is in a better position
than her neighbor to foresee the extent of possible harm and take steps to
prevent it.15 Placing costs on the improver spurs the use of best available
technology, within limits set by efficiency, to minimize total costs. 116
Unfortunately, the expense of redistributing costs can undermine effi-
ciency. 117 This tension between equity and efficiency diminishes as the costs
of redistribution decrease. 118 In any case, fair cost allocation provides a
'llSee Tromans, supra note 107, at 88-89, 97-98.
112See, e.g., Swanson v. Bishop Farm, Inc., 140 Vt. 606,443 A.2d 464 (1982). "A proper resort to
equity does not always invoke the application of extraordinary or severe relief by way of a mandatory
injunction." Id. at 610, 443 A.2d at 466. This represents a trend in nuisance law since the 1970s
recognizing the often immense economic consequences of granting equitable relief. See Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
113See A. Polinsky, supra note 105, at 7; see also Ogus & Richardson, Economics and the
Environment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 Cambridge L.J. 284, 286 (1977).
"
4 Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1084. This conception of "fairness" may cut down the middle, as in
traditional tort law, to restore injured parties to their pre-injured status, or it may be weighted to
redistribute income in accordance with some scheme of social welfare. See id. at 1100.
115Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, andFines as Land Use Controls, 40
U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 726 (1973).
1161d. at 724. For example, suppose a contemplated drainage will do $500 damage to neighboring
property, but that use of certain technology, costing only $100, would reduce those damages by
$200. If the improving landowner is liable for the damage, she will certainly use that technology
and save herself $100. However, if she is immune from liability, she will have no incentive to
use the technology. Beyond the obvious economic effects, this may have tremendous environmental
consequences.
il7See A. Polinsky, supra note 105, at 113.
S8See id. at 9.
GEO. MASON U.L. REV.
commendable yardstick for selecting between equally efficient alterna-
tives. 119 Thus, for purposes of this analysis, the "best" liability rule is
that which most fairly allocates costs without sacrificing efficiency.
3. A Hypothetical Setting for the Analysis
To facilitate the economic analysis, we will consider the effect of each
liability rule on the following hypothetical case: Hamilton and Jefferson
own abutting 300 acre farms. The farms are of equal value and the
farmers cultivate the same crop. Jefferson's land sits slightly higher than
Hamilton's. As a result, surface waters flow naturally from Jefferson to
Hamilton, periodically flooding fifty acres of Hamilton's land and rendering
them unproductive. 120 Jefferson, by contrast, cultivates all but the ten acres
of his farm where water accumulates. 121
Suppose that Jefferson digs a ditch to drain these last ten acres for
cultivation. The drainage yields a profit of $200, but floods an additional
five acres of Hamilton's land, at a cost of $100. Jefferson's ditch therefore
yields net profits of $100, less transaction costs.
Irked by Jefferson's drainage, Hamilton responds by constructing a
dam along the entire Hamilton/Jefferson border. Thanks to the dam,
Hamilton can now cultivate his entire 300 acres. He realizes a
profit of $1100. But the dam causes periodic flooding that renders
150 acres of Jefferson's land unproductive, at a cost of $3000.
Consequently, the dam generates net costs of $1900, plus transac-
tion costs.
The "best" liability rule would entitle Jefferson's ditch, which yields
net profits, but not Hamilton's dam, which generates net costs. While
entitling Jefferson's ditch, the "best" rule would compensate Hamilton for
his damages ($100).
B. The Common Enemy Rule
1. Efficiency
The pure (i.e., unmodified) common enemy rule permits landowners
to cast surface waters onto their neighbors with impunity. t22 It entitles
Hamilton's net unprofitable dam as well as Jefferson's net profitable ditch
with total disregard for the economic consequences.
119See Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1084.
120 1t is important to remember that none of the liability rules entitles a landowner to protection from
naturally occurring drainage, i.e., drainage that results merely from the lie of the land. Liability only
attaches, if at all, where a landowner takes some action to alter surface water flows.
121Note that under our efficiency and equity goals it should not matter that this drainage occurs in a rural
setting as opposed to an urban setting, except that the presumption of equal land values and similar
land uses is perhaps more plausible in a rural setting. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
'
22See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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The common enemy doctrine has grown more efficient as its recent
modifications have extended liability. For example, in states that hold
landowners liable for artificial drainways, 123 both Jefferson and Hamilton
might be able to recover for the damages they have suffered. 124 This would
certainly promote efficiency in the case of Hamilton's dam because under
any remedy its use will likely discontinue, and that is the efficient result.
In the case of Jefferson's ditch, where efficiency was promoted even under
the pure common enemy rule, the modification will also promote efficiency
unless the court enjoins the ditch.
Efficiency may also improve under the "reasonable care" modifica-
tion of the common enemy doctrine, assuming that courts applying this
modification utilize a cost-benefit analysis to determine reasonableness. 125
However, some states employing the "reasonable care" modification do
not test the drainage itself, but merely the resulting damage; if the damage
is reasonably necessary to the desired improvement, then liability does not
attach, even if the improvement itself is unreasonable. 126 In those states,
as long as the damage resulting from Hamilton's dam was a reasonably
necessary consequence of dam construction and use, the courts will not
grant Jefferson any relief. Therefore, the modification does not appreciably
improve the common enemy doctrine's efficiency. Similarly, the modifica-
tion prohibiting negligent or malicious discharges fails to enhance efficiency
because it entitles even unprofitable drainages so long as they relate to some
improvement and are not otherwise negligent. 127
2. Equity
While the pure common enemy doctrine is simply indifferent to
economic efficiency, its disregard for equity is by design. By insulating
the improving landowner from liability in every case, the rule permits
cost externalization to foster development. It permits neither Jefferson nor
Hamilton to recover for their damages, and therefore is not equitable.
The recent modifications of the common enemy doctrine were designed
specifically to remedy the perceived unfairness of the extreme rule.' 28
123See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
124Most states would consider Jefferson's ditch an artificial drainage. See, e.g., Buffalo Sewer Authority
v. Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47, 228 N.E.2d 386, 281 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1967).
125For a court employing this modification, see, e.g., Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491,519 P.2d
7 (1974); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
126See, e.g., Seventeen, Inc. v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 215 Va. 74, 205 S.E.2d 648 (1974).
127See, e.g., Paasch v. Brown, 190 Neb. 421, 208 N.W.2d 695 (1973); see also supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
12SSee Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891, 913 (1940).
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However, they do not go far enough. So long as the improving landowner
uses natural drainways, 129 exercises good faith, 130 or employs reasonable
care in draining surface waters, 131 no liability attaches and injured neighbors
cannot recover their actual damages.
C. The Natural Flow Theory
1. Efficiency
The goal of the natural flow theory is not efficient development,
but preservation of the status quo between neighboring landowners. 132
Nevertheless, this rule does permit efficiency by placing courts in a position
to grant a remedy that achieves an efficient result. Assuming that courts base
remedy decisions on efficiency, the rule discourages "strategic behavior"
that might prevent parties from bargaining to an efficient result.
Under the unmodified natural flow theory, Jefferson and Hamilton are
each liable for the harm caused by their activities. The court's task is to fash-
ion a remedy suitable to ameliorate the harm. As we have seen, 133 under the
efficiency goal, the "suitable" remedy generally prohibits (or discourages)
unprofitable drainage and entitles (or encourages) profitable drainage.
Jefferson's ditch produces a net profit of $100, less transaction costs.
Therefore, under the efficiency goal, his drainage should continue. A court
employing the natural flow theory can ensure this by restricting recovery to
money damages not exceeding the aggregate profit (less transaction costs,
including court costs). 134 By so doing, the court also encourages the parties
to negotiate (at least, it does not prevent them from negotiating) to an
efficient settlement. 135 However, if the court enjoins the ditch, efficiency
is lost. 136 Moreover, if Hamilton knows beforehand that the court will
129See supra notes 21 & 123-24 and accompanying text.
130See supra notes 22 & 127 and accompanying text.
131See supra notes 23, 124-26 and accompanying text.
132See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
133See generally supra Part IIA of this article.
134 Note that this assumes that the court has perfect information concerning the nature and extent of
the damages. To the extent that imperfect information may cause the court to over-estimate or
under-estimate damages, inefficiency may result. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. In fact,
the natural flow theory has been criticized because of the informational (i.e., evidentiary) problems it
creates. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. This problem also affects the reasonable use rule.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Therefore, because this is a comparative analysis, the
problem of imperfect information does not provide grounds for choosing between the natural flow
theory and the reasonable use rule.
135See supra note 107 and accompanying text. By restricting recovery to actual damages, the courts
also discourage de minimis lawsuits, a major concern in states employing the civil law rule. See,
e.g., Schmitt v. Kirkpatrick, 245 Iowa 971, 63 N.W.2d 228 (1954).
136As we have seen, courts today do consider efficiency before granting relief. A court applying the
civil law rule would likely not grant an injunction under these circumstances.
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enjoin Jefferson's ditch, even though it is efficient, he will likely engage in
"strategic behavior" that prevents the parties from bargaining to an efficient
result. 137
In the case of Hamilton's dam, it theoretically makes no difference
whether the court enjoins the dam or merely awards Jefferson's actual
damages. In either case, Hamilton will stop damming the flow because it
costs him $1900 plus transaction costs more than it benefits him'.
Clearly then, the unmodified natural flow theory of liability per-
mits courts, and the parties before them, to achieve efficiency in every
case. However, to the extent courts have modified the civil law rule to
limit liability, efficiency has been compromised. 138 In every case where
a modification insulates improving landowners from liability, unprofitable
drainages will continue unabated. 139 On the other hand, the modification
fashioned by the California courts actually enhances efficiency by placing
an affirmative duty on the injured party to take all reasonable measures to
minimize damages. 140
2. Equity
The very purpose of the natural flow theory is to preserve the natural
state of affairs between neighboring properties regarding surface water
drainage. 141 To that end, courts applying this rule either prohibit (i.e.,
enjoin) or require compensation for any injurious change in the status
quo. As a result, costs are fairly allocated; i.e., they are born ultimately
137An efficient result in this case lies anywhere between $100 and $200, less transaction costs. If
Hamilton knows that the court will enjoin Jefferson's ditch, he may hold-out for a better settlement
than Jefferson is willing to agree to. See Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1092-94. This extortionate
behavior is averted where the court's remedy is limited to actual damages.
138The civil law rule has been modified to limit liability where the harmful drainage (1) used natural
drainways, (2) was reasonable and not negligent, or (3) occurred in an urban area. See supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text. Only the second modification would affect Jefferson and Hamilton.
Jefferson's drainage is reasonable (assuming reasonableness is determined in a cost-benefit analysis)
and apparently not negligent. Under this modification, Jefferson would not be liable to Hamilton. This
would only affect efficiency to the extent it encourages Jefferson to engage in "strategic behavior."
On the other hand, this modification would totally defeat an equitable solution because Hamilton
would be unable to recover his actual damages.
t39The situation is precisely analogous to that under the common enemy doctrine. See supra note 122
and accompanying text. In addition, to the extent that improving landowners are insulated from
liability, they may engage in "strategic behavior" that prevents the parties from negotiating an
efficient settlement. See supra notes 106 & 136 and accompanying text.
t40See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
14 1See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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by the improving landowner. 142 In our hypothetical, Jefferson would have
to compensate Hamilton for the damages caused by his ditch, and Hamilton
would have to compensate Jefferson for the damages caused by his dam. But
the natural flow theory does not equitably allocate costs at the expense of
efficiency. To the contrary, the rule achieves the fair result while, in every
case, permitting an efficient result, dependent only on the remedy the court
chooses. 143
To the extent modifications of the natural flow theory shield improving
landowners from liability, the costs of resulting damages will be shouldered
unfairly by the "innocent" neighbors. 144 The California modification, on
the other hand, enhances equity just as it enhances efficiency, 145 by placing
an affirmative duty on the neighboring landowner to take reasonable care
to protect her lands from harm. 146 To the extent the neighbor fails to
reasonably protect her lands, the court will deny recovery. 147
14 2Note that there is at least one situation where, it may be claimed, the civil law rule does not achieve
the "equitable" result. For instance, if the court enjoined Jefferson's cost-efficient ditch, Jefferson
would suffer a loss of the $100 profit, plus the cost of digging the ditch, plus transaction costs.
Aside from being inefficient, this result is arguably inequitable. One solution would be to require
Hamilton to pay for the injunction, to compensate Jefferson for his costs. This solution has been
championed on efficiency grounds by at least one commentator, and adopted by one court. See
Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972); Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 681, 738-39 (1973).
The "fair" allocation of costs may also depend on actions taken or not taken by the improving
landowner's neighbor to prevent damage to her property. Under the goal of equity without sacrificing
efficiency, it would be unfair to make the improving landowner bear costs that could have been
costlessly avoided by the neighbor. The California modification to the natural flow theory avoids
this possibility by placing an affirmative duty on the neighbor to use reasonable care to prevent
unnecessary harm. See supra notes 54-57, 139 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 144 &
145 and accompanying text.
14 3See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
1'"This result attends (1) the natural drainways modification, supra note 51 and accompanying text; (2)
the reasonable use modification, supra note 52 and accompanying text; and (3) the urban development
modification, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
14 5See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146See supra notes 54-57, 140 and accompanying text.
147See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d at 411, 412 P.2d at 538, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 282; Sheffet v. County of
Los Angeles, 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, 729-30, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11, 16-17 (1970). This does not necessarily
mean that the neighbor must sustain costs to prevent harm. It merely prevents neighbors from unfairly
taking advantage of the improving landowner, for example, by aggravating the damage. See supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
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D. The Reasonable Use Rule
1. Efficiency
Liability under the reasonable use rule depends primarily on a cost-
benefit analysis; if the drainage yields net benefits, the improving landowner
is not liable for damages. 148 Efficiency, therefore, is built into the rule.
Discounting the possibility of imperfect information, the reasonable use rule
will always yield an efficient result because it will only impose liability for
net unprofitable drainages. 149 Under this rule, Hamilton will be. liable, but
Jefferson will not.
However, like the natural flow theory, the reasonable use rule is
subject to imperfect information that can impair the court's cost-benefit
analysis and jeopardize efficiency. 150 Unless the court has accurate informa-
tion concerning the drainage, it may over-estimate the costs and/or benefits.
For example, if the court's information suggests that before Jefferson's ditch
only twenty acres of Hamilton's land was flooded (instead of fifty acres),
then the court will conclude that the ditch flooded an additional thirty-five
acres of Hamilton's land (instead of five). As a result, the court might
estimate Hamilton's damages at $700 ($600 more than his true damages
and $500 more than Jefferson's aggregate benefits). The court would then
hold Jefferson liable and effectively enjoin what is, in reality, an efficient
drainage.
Under the reasonable use rule, the court's remedy decision should not
affect efficiency, assuming again that the court's cost-benefit analysis is not
faulty. 151 Remedies can only affect efficiency when liability is imposed.
But, under this rule, liability is only imposed on unprofitable drainages;
in our hypothetical, only Hamilton would be liable under the reasonable use
rule. Whether the court enjoins his dam or merely awards Jefferson's actual
damages, Hamilton will (theoretically) stop damming the flow of surface
waters.
148See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
149Note that strategic behavior should not be a problem under this rule because the entitlement is never
certain until the parties get to court. Of course, if the improving landowner is fairly certain that
his drainage is "reasonable," then she is in a superior bargaining position because she knows her
neighbor has no chance of recovering even actual damages.
'
5
°See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
15 0fcourse, ifthe court has imperfect information that impairs its cost-benefit analysis, the court might
hold the improving landowner liable for an efficient drainage. The court's subsequent remedy decision
then determines whether an efficient result is achieved, in spite of the faulty cost-benefit analysis.
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2. Equity
Courts employing the reasonable use rule praise its fairness, 152 but they
are like the economist who maintains that if the pie is big enough, it does
not matter how it is sliced' Once the court concludes that Jefferson's ditch
is reasonable (i.e., efficient), the case is over; Jefferson keeps his ditch
and his $200 profit, and Hamilton must bear the $100 cost. This result
violates fundamental conceptions of fairness and negates any incentive the
improving landowner might have to minimize costs, including environ-
mental degradation. 153 Thus, under the reasonable use rule, the fair result
is achieved only when the disputed drainage is inefficient; an efficient
drainage is never combined with a fair result.
E. Results of the Analysis
1. Efficiency
Both the natural flow theory and the reasonable use rule allow
courts to achieve an efficient result in every case. However, both rules are
constrained by evidentiary problems that can affect efficiency, and the civil
law rule's efficiency ultimately depends on the court's choice of remedy. 154
The common enemy doctrine disregards economic efficiency entirely.
2. Equity
Where fairness depends on the appropriate allocation of drainage costs,
only the natural flow theory is consistently fair. Under that rule, the
improving landowner is always liable for damages caused to neighboring
properties. And the reasonable use rule only compensates injured neighbors
when the disputed drainage is inefficient; so long as the drainage generates
net profits, the improving landowner is entitled to externalize some of her
costs (e.g., the damages).
Clearly then, the natural flow theory is the "best" liability rule because
it most fairly allocates costs without sacrificing efficiency.
152See, e.g., Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (1975).
153See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
I'*To the extent this is a problem, it is more appropriately labelled a judicial problem than a natural
flow theory problem. See infra note 158.
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CONCLUSION
Since 1940, virtually every court that has embraced the reasonable
use rule for resolving surface water conflicts has justified the change on
fairness and efficiency grounds.1 55 But not one court has ever tested this
justification. New courts that adopt the rule simply repeat the reasons given
by other courts. 156 Unfortunately, no matter how many times the rationale is
repeated, saying it does not make it so.
The reasonable use rule is clearly not fair, where fairness depends on
the equitable allocation of costs. Only the civil law's natural flow theory
consistently imposes all the costs of drainage on the improving landowner
without sacrificing efficiency. 157
The reasonable use rule does not promote efficiency any better than the
pure natural flow theory, which permits courts to achieve an efficient result
in every case, subject only to evidentiary problems and choice of remedy.
Though choice of remedy is theoretically not a problem for the reasonable
use rule, 158 the rule is subject to the same evidentiary difficulties as the
civil law rule. Consequently, there is no convincing reason for preferring
the reasonable use rule over the natural flow theory on efficiency grounds.
In the final analysis, where economic goals prevail, the civil law's
natural flow theory is preferable to both the reasonable use rule and the
common enemy doctrine because it fairly allocates costs, while permitting
the court to achieve an efficient result in every case. This conclusion is
remarkable for three reasons: (1) the natural flow theory existed long before
economic goals prevailed; (2) courts and commentators have long criticized
the civil law rule for being uneconomic; and (3) the reasonable use rule
emerged specifically to advance economic goals.
Obviously then, the current trend in favor of the reasonable use rule is
misguided. Courts should reconsider decisions that adopt the reasonable use
rule over the natural flow theory, since the latter is more appropriate to their
stated goals. And, in the future, courts should beware of accepting as gospel
the untested assumptions and reasoning of other courts.
155See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
'S6See, e.g., Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 215-16, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977) (citing
Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975)).
157 0f course, the modifications of this rule have, to greater or lesser extents, diminished the rule's
fairness, with the exception of the California modification which actually enhances both equity and
efficiency. See supra notes 139 & 144 and accompanying text.
15SChoice of remedy is really not a problem of the natural flow theory either; it is more appropriately
a problem of the courts. The natural flow theory merely gives courts the opportunity to undermine
efficiency by their choice of remedy because liability is imposed in every case. The other liability
theories avoid this "problem" by not giving the courts the opportunity to choose a remedy in
every case.
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